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The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet’s ‘intentional stance’
compares neural activation when participants compete with a human
versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural
or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional
magnetic resonance imaging study is, to our knowledge, the first to investi-
gate the intentional stance by orthogonally varying perceptions of the
opponents’ intentionality (responding actively or passively according to a
script) and embodiment (human or a computer). The mere perception of
the opponent (whether human or computer) as intentional activated the men-
talizing network: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, right temporal
pole, anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) and the precuneus. Interacting with
humans versus computers induced activations in a more circumscribed right
lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, consisting of the TPJ
and the aPCC, possibly reflective of the tendency to spontaneously attribute
intentionality to humans. The interaction between intentionality (active
versus passive) and opponent (human versus computer) recruited the left
frontal pole, possibly in response to violations of the default intentional
stance towards humans and computers. Employing an orthogonal design is
important to adequately capture Dennett’s conception of the intentional
stance as a mentalizing strategy that can apply equally well to humans and
other intentional agents.1. Introduction
Towhat extent do the cognitive and neural processes involved in playing a com-
petitive game depend on whether one’s interactive partner is human? This
question bears not only upon theories about the nature of social cognition [1].
It is also of relevance to our everyday lives, in which we interact increasingly
with artificially intelligent agents such as robots, computers and avatars, and
in which our live interactions with other humans are increasingly mediated
through electronic media. A burgeoning literature on social neuroscience has
associated such interactions with two types of processes. One is theory of
mind (ToM) or mentalizing, which is typically viewed as ‘cold cognition’
about the beliefs, desires and intentions of one’s interactive partner [2]. Mentaliz-
ing focuses on the partner’s status as a rational, intentional agent, with little
regard for the nature of their affective and physical embodiment, and has consist-
ently been associated with activations in the posterior superior temporal sulcus/
temporoparietal region (TPJ) and themedial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (including
the anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC)). A second type of process is mirroring,
which is typically viewed as ‘flesh-and-blood’ simulation of a partner’s physical
actions and affective reactions [3–7]. In contrast with mentalizing, mirroring
focuses on the partner’s embodiment, with little regard for the explicit content
of their thoughts. While mirroring is commonly associated with activation in
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2the parietal lobule, the premotor cortex and the inferior frontal
gyrus, there is also evidence for mirroring properties in brain
regions associatedwithmentalizing, including the TPJ and the
anterior MPFC. In the present study, we investigated the pro-
cesses involved in playing a competitive game by varying
perceptions of the interactive partner’s intentionality (they
responded freely or according to a script) and their embodi-
ment (they were a human or a computer).
In a very influential paper, titled ‘Imaging the intentional
stance’, Gallagher et al. [8] were the first to employ the human-
player versus computer-player contrast in a neuroimaging
study. In this study, volunteers were asked to play a version of
the ‘rock, paper, scissors’ (RPS) game against a human opponent
or a computer following simple rule-based strategy. In compar-
ing the two conditions (human minus computer), only the aPCC
(BA 9/32, bilaterally) was differentially active. Several studies
employing various interactive games followed, using a similar
script according to which participants were led to believe that
theywere playing either against a human opponent or a compu-
ter [9–14]. For example, stronger activations in theMPFCand the
thalamus were observed when playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game against a human than against a computer [10], and that
during a matching-pennies game activity within the social
brain including the TPJ depended on the extent to which
agents were perceived as anthropomorphic or intelligent-look-
ing [14]. Moreover, using a variant of the RPS game,
Chaminade et al. [9] reported bilateral activation in the MPFC
and TPJ and the right thalamus when contrasting participants
playing against a human versus playing a computer generating
moves at random. In a further contrast between the human anda
robot that participants believed to be endowed with artificial
intelligence, only the TPJ was active, leading the authors to con-
clude that the TPJwas specifically involved inmentalizing about
humans. Importantly, in this study, the human-player was pre-
sented at all times as an ‘intentional agent’ with a calculated
strategy to win.
However, while these studies drew inspiration from
a prominent theoretical account of mentalizing—Dennet’s
‘intentional stance’ theory [15]—they do not accurately capture
Dennet’s original conception. Dennett [15, p. 17] summarizes
the intentional stance as follows ‘Here is how it works: first
you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted
as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent
ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose.
Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the
same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational
agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs.
A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and
desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the
agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do’.
Dennett takes great care to point out that the intentional
stance may be adopted towards any object (animal, vegetable
or mineral), but that its use naturally depends upon the
degree to which that object fulfils the stance’s assumption that
it is a rational agent. Thus, all there is to being an intentional
system is to be a system whose behaviour is well explained by
adopting the intentional stance, andwhich does not necessarily
require perceiving the object itself to havemental states (see also
[16,17]). In other words, the intentional stance applies just as
appropriately to all rational agents, including humans and arti-
ficially intelligent robots and computers, and it applies just as
inappropriately to humans who lack rationality or free will as
it does to pocket calculators. This means that the commonlyused paradigm of comparing neural activation when partici-
pants compete with a rational human agent and a computer
that follows simple rules actually confounds distinct factors:
whether the opponent is natural or artificial, and whether the
opponent is a rational, intentional agent oran automaton. Exist-
ing results in the literature could be owing either to variation in
participants’ use of the intentional stance for mentalizing, or to
variation in their response to interactingwith a human versus a
computer (via mirroring, or some other process), or to some
combination of these. The present study is, to our knowledge,
the first in the literature to de-confound these factors in a fully
orthogonal design. It should be noted, of course, that orthogon-
ality of the experimental factors does not necessarily imply that
the measured functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal responses will
themselves be orthogonal.
Orthogonal variation of the type of competitor and their
level of intentionality yields four conditions, the participant
plays against one of: an actively competitive human; a non-
competitive human who passively follows a predetermined
response script; an actively competitive computer endowed
with artificial intelligence; and a non-competitive computer
that passively follows a predetermined response script.
Main effects of the level of intentionality (active versus
passive responses) should identify those brain regions
involved in deploying the intentional stance in the manner
envisaged by Dennett—that is to say, irrespective of whether
the target is human or computer. To the degree that mentaliz-
ing is well characterized as the adoption of an intentional
stance, this main effect should overlap with brain regions
commonly associated with mentalizing. Main effects of the
type of competitor (human versus computer) should identify
brain regions that are distinctively involved in interacting
with humans rather than computers, and as described
above, the existing literature leads to the prediction that this
might involve circumscribed regions within the mentalizing
network, namely the TPJ and the MPFC, and perhaps a
broader set of regions associated with mirroring. Finally,
the interaction between the intentionality and competitor
identity factors should identify those brain regions in which
the demands of deploying the intentional stance depend on
the nature of the competitor. Although the expectation that
humans are a special target for mentalizing is a mischarac-
terization of Dennett’s intentional stance theory, there are of
course other reasons why this expectation is plausible. Most
obviously, humans are surely the most frequent target for
mentalizing outside of experimental contexts. This might
lead the intentional stance to be the default stance towards
humans but not computers. One possible outcome of such
a default is disproportionately large effects for the human
intentional opponent, while another is that processing may
be more effortful when the default must be overcome.
2. Methods
(a) Participants
Twenty-four right-handed, English-proficient healthy adults
(five males; 19 females; mean age (s.d.) = 21.21 ± 4.21)) partici-
pated in the study. All participants were students from the
University of Birmingham. Exclusion criteria included having a
history of psychiatric illness, epilepsy, neurological disorders,
brain injury as well as current alcohol or substance abuse
problems.
0.5 s
3
2
1
GO
repeat you opponent
0.5 s
0.5 s
1 s
0.5 s
4 s
Figure 1. Each trial began with a countdown 3, 2, 1 in 0.5 s intervals, followed by ‘GO’ during which the participants made their moves. The ‘GO’ was present for
1 s followed by a 0.5 s blank screen. The results screen is then displayed for 4 s indicating the moves drawn by both players and the outcome. The winning move is
displayed with a yellow star. (Online version in colour.)
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3(b) Materials and procedures
In the pre-screening session, English reading proficiency was
assessed with the Test of Irregular Word Reading Efficiency
(TIWRE) [18] and the Test of Word Reading Efficiency
(TOWRE) [19] questionnaires. Handedness was ascertained
with the modified Annett Handedness Questionnaire [20].
During the scanning session, participants performed two tasks.
The first was a computerized version of the RPS game. The
second was Hartwright et al.’s [21] British English variant of
Saxe & Kanwisher’s ToM [22] functional localizer task. At the
end of the scanning session, all participants went through a
debriefing interview. The study was approved by the University
of Birmingham Research Ethics Committee, and written
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
(c) The rock, paper, scissors task
In this task, participants were required to predict the moves of
their opponent in order to win. The game has the following
simple rules: rock beats scissors, paper beats rock and scissors
beat paper. The winner of each round was awarded 1 point.
A no-response resulted in an automatic win for the opponent,
and identical moves resulted in a draw and no points were
awarded. Here, we orthogonally manipulated the intentional
stance during the game in such a way that the participants
were led to believe that they were playing under four conditions:
(i) against an active human agent who was a professional RPS
player, (ii) a passive human agent who followed a predetermined
response script, (iii) an active intelligent computer program (fic-
tional, called AIRPS) that was capable of analysing the
participant’s strategy, and (iv) a passive computer program that
followed a predetermined response script.
Participants were cautioned not to use a stereotyped strategy
and to play competitively with the intention of beating their
opponent. Feedback was provided during the scan sessions as
to how well the participant was scoring at the end of each
block of 10 rounds of the game and a summary of the results
at the end of each fMRI run. Positive scoring and effort were
rewarded with a prize of ₤10 for the highest performing partici-
pant overall at the end of the study. Before each one of the four
conditions, participants were provided with on-screen instruc-
tions to remind them of what they were required to do and
which opponent they would be playing. These instructions
were also used to induce a shift in the participant’s stancetowards their opponent. To reinforce the impression that the par-
ticipant was truly playing against a ‘human’ opponent, a 3%
fallibility ‘no-response’ measure was embedded during the
human conditions. It is important to note that ‘intentional
stance’ is one among three different stances—the others being
design stance and physical stance. There may be degrees of inten-
tional stance, but we are not deliberately investigating these here.
Importantly, unbeknownst to the participants, the game was
always played against a computer program generating moves
entirely at random. The design ensured that the only difference
across the conditions was the particular stance the participant
was adopting under the various conditions. Of course, there
was always the possibility that participants would not behave
in the expected manner under the various conditions. Accord-
ingly, a briefing procedure was used after the scanning session
during which participants were asked to recount how they
understood and experienced these conditions. This information
was gathered to ascertain the intentional stance adopted under
the various conditions. Crucially, none of the participants
expressed doubt regarding the identity of the four opponents.
The RPS experiment consisted of five fMRI runs, each lasting
440 s per run (approx. 40 min total). Each fMRI run consisted of
four blocks, representing the four conditions of interest. The
sequence of opponents was chosen from eight predetermined
player-sequences (chosen from the 24 possible sequences) such
that on each sequence the human and the computer opponents
were presented in alternating order. On four of the sequences,
the participants’ first opponentwas a humanandon the remaining
four a computer. The sequences the participants’ played, in each of
the five fMRI runs, were selected in a pseudorandom order in the
followingmanner: the first participant played sequences 1 through
to 5, the second participants played sequences 6,7,8,1,2, the third
participant played sequences 3,4,5,6,7,8 and so forth.
Each block was preceded by a 10 s period during which the
instructions were displayed, and followed by a 30 s rest period.
During each block, the participant played 10 trials against one of
the four possible opponents. Response selections (i.e. rock, paper
or scissors) were made using a button box with three active buttons
that was placed in the participant’s right hand. Figure 1 presents a
schematic of stimuli presentation and timing during each trial.
All participants went through a practice session of two blocks out-
side the scanner. The experiment was presented using PRESENTATION
(Neurobehavioral Systems, CA, USA), which also recorded the
behavioural data (button pressed and reaction time).
Table 1. Cluster peaks for the RPS task.
hemisphere and region
MNI coordinates
Z valueX Y Z
active > passive
L angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, temporoparietal junction −44 −60 32 4.94
R angular gyrus, temporoparietal junction, supramarginal gyrus 56 −50 30 4.70
anterior paracingulate cortex −10 44 24 5.16
L/R precuneous −8 −60 36 3.90
R temporal pole 28 14 −26 4.43
L middle temporal gyrus −56 −26 −14 4.39
R middle temporal gyrus 60 −20 −16 4.62
passive > active
superior parietal lobule 36 −52 62 3.97
human > computer
R angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, temporoparietal junction 54 −62 16 3.32
anterior paracingulate cortex 10 48 30 3.43
computer > human
L frontal pole −24 44 −18 4.65
R frontal pole 18 46 −20 3.38
interaction (active computer + passive human) – (passive computer + active human)
L frontal pole −34 46 −16 4.17
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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4(d) The theory of mind localizer task
This taskwasused to reliably identify regionswithin thementalizing
network, which include the TPJ, the paracingulate/MPFC and pre-
cuneus and the temporal pole. In this experiment, we used
Hartwright et al.’s [21] anglicized variant of the Saxe & Kanwisher’s
task [22] duringwhich participants read 24 short vignettes thatwere
displayedon the screen for 10 s.Half of the storiesdescribed the false
belief of a character about the current state of affairs (i.e. the false
belief (FB) stories), and the other half described a physical event
that is non-concurrent with reality such as a photo of a past event
(i.e. the false photograph (FP) stories). Each story was followed by
a true–false question that was displayed for 4 s, and to which they
responded using a response box with two active buttons that was
placed in the participant’s left hand. The task consisted of four
short fMRI runs. In each run, six stories, three FB and three FP,
were presented in an alternating order, interleaved with a 12.5 s
rest period. All participants went through a practice session of four
trials outside the scanner. The experiment was presented using
PRESENTATION (Neurobehavioural Systems, CA, USA), which also
recordedthebehaviouraldata (response selectionandreaction time).
(e) Functional magnetic resonance imaging data
acquisition and analysis
Datawere acquired in a single scanning session using a 3 T Philips
Achieva scanner. One hundred and seventy-six T2*-weighted
standard echo planar imaging (EPI) volumes were obtained in
each of the RPS task runs, using a 32 channel head coil. Parameters
used to achieve whole-brain coverage are as follows: repetition
time (TR) = 2.5 s, echo time (TE) = 35 ms, acquisition matrix =
80 × 80, flip angle = 83°, isotropic voxels 3 × 3 × 3 mm3, 42 slices
axial acquisition obtained consecutively in a bottom-up sequence.
Using the sameparameters, 71 EPI volumeswere acquired for each
run of the localizer task.AT1-weighted scanwas then acquired as asingle volume at higher spatial resolution as a three-dimensional
(3D) turbo field echo (TFE) image (matrix size 288 × 288, 175
slices, sagittally acquired and reconstructed to 1 × 1 × 1 mm3
isotropic voxels: TE = 3.8 ms, TR = 8.4 ms).
Preprocessing and statistical analyses of the data were per-
formed using the functional magnetic resonance imaging of the
brain (FMRIB) software library (FSL v. v. 5.0.6; FMRIB, Oxford,
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). For both experiments, initial preproces-
sing of the functional data consisted of slice timing correction, and
motion correction FMRIB’s linear image registration tool
(MCFLIRT). The BOLD signals were high-pass filtered using a
Gaussian weighted filter to remove low-frequency drifts in the
bold signal. Spatial smoothing of the BOLD signal was performed
using a 5 mm full-width-half-maximum kernel. The functional
datawere registered to their respective structural images and trans-
formed to a standard template based on theMontreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) reference brain, using a 6 degrees of freedom linear
transformation (FLIRT).
( f ) Rock, paper, scissors task experiment analysis
Playing against a computer or a human, with either agency or by
following a script, provided the four baseline conditions. These
four conditions comprised a 2 × 2 ANOVA experimental design
with factor 1 being the human versus computer opponent and
factor 2 being the element of implied agency from the opponent
(active versus passive). Condition regressors were convolved
with the canonical haemodynamic response functionwithin a gen-
eral linear model (GLM) framework. A high-pass filter with a cut-
off of 105 swasused.Motionparameterswere treated as regressors
of no interest in order to account for unwantedmotion effects. Ses-
sion data were aggregated per participant using a second-level
fixed effects model. Third-level modelling was used to aggregate
the data across participants in a 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVAwith active versus passive and human versus computer
(a) (b)
(d)(c)
Figure 2. Activations of the active minus passive contrast (red), passive minus active contrast (cyan), human minus computer contrast (green), computer minus human
(magenta) and the interaction (blue) are presented on (a) coronal (Y =−59), (b) sagittal (X =−10) and (c) axial (Z =−16) planes. Yellow areas in (a,b,d ) reflect
overlapping areas between the active minus passive and the human minus computer contrasts. The overlap analysis between the active minus passive and human minus
computer revealed shared activation in the paracingulate [−2, 54, 8] and the rTPJ [50, −60, 18] (Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05). (d ) An annotated 3D summary image.
Images are displayed in neurological convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. (Online version in colour.)
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5aswithin-subjects factors, employing amixed-effects analysiswith
cluster-based thresholding at Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05.
(g) Localizer task experiment analysis
The localizer task was modelled as per Hartwright et al. [21]. The
FB and the FP conditions were convolved with a gamma-derived
canonical haemodynamic response function within a GLM.
A high-pass filter with a cut-off of 21 s was used. Second- and
third-level modelling were used to aggregate the data across
sessions and participants for the contrast of interest FB > FP.
Individual’s participant session data were aggregated using a
fixed effects model at second level, and the group data were
aggregated at third level using a mixed-effects analysis with
cluster-based thresholding at Z > 3.6, pcorr < 0.05.
(h) Overlap analysis
Overlap analysis between the thresholded data (Z > 2.3, pcorr <
0.05) for the human > computer and the active > passive contrasts
was conducted to identify shared activations across the two thre-
sholded contrasts. We also conducted an overlap analysis
between these two contrasts and the FB > FP contrast of
the ToM localizer task. The analysis was conducted with FSL’s
easythresh function [23].3. Results
(a) Behavioural results
Performance on the RPS task was examined using a 2 (human
versus computer) × 2 (active versus passive) repeated
measures. The analysis revealed non-significant main effects
(active versus passive; F1,23 = 1.87, p = 0.18; human versus
computer; F1,23 = 2.19, p = 0.15) or interaction F1,23 = 0.17,
p = 0.68), suggesting that participants won equally likely
across all conditions.
With respect to the FB task, a pair-t-test revealed that
there were no differences between the FB and FP conditions
in either proportion correct responses (t22 = 1.69, p = 0.11) or
reaction times (t22 = 1.25, p = 0.23).(b) Whole-brain analysis
(i) Rock, paper, scissors task
A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of the RPS task identified
main effects of the game partner (computer versus human)
and intentionality (active versus passive), as well as an
Table 2. Cluster peaks for the ToM localizer task.
hemisphere and region
MNI coordinates
Z valueX Y Z
false belief > false photograph
L angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, supramarginal gyrus, temporoparietal junction −56 −62 28 6.18
R angular gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, temporoparietal junction 56 −64 30 5.22
L/R paracingulate cortex, frontal pole 0 58 10 5.87
L/R precuneus 0 −60 30 6.85
L/R cingulate cortex 0 −16 34 5.59
R medial frontal gyrus 44 12 50 4.54
R frontal orbital 50 30 −16 4.72
L inferior/middle temporal gyrus −50 0 −40 5.81
R inferior/middle temporal gyrus 50 0 −38 6.43
L cerebellum crus II −28 −84 −36 6.25
R cerebellum crus II 30 −86 −36 5.09
L cerbellum IX, vermis VIIIb −6 −62 −44 5.04
L amygdala −18 −4 −20 4.08
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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6interaction between the two factors. Playing an active rather
than a passive opponent largely recruited a network of regions
associated with mentalizing, which included the TPJ bilater-
ally, right temporal pole, aPCC and precuneus. In addition,
the middle temporal gyri were activated. The reverse contrast
of passive minus active revealed activation only in the superior
parietal lobule. Playing a human rather than a computer,
activations were observed in the right TPJ and the aPCC
only. Here, the reverse contrast of computer minus human
revealed bilateral activations in the frontal pole. Intriguingly,
the interaction between the implied agency (i.e. whether
the opponent is active or passive) and the game partner
(i.e. whether the opponent is computer or human) elicited acti-
vation in the left frontal pole only, specifically in the (active
computer × passive human) minus (passive computer × active
human) contrast (table 1 and figure 2).(ii) Theory of mind localizer task
The mixed-effect analysis of the FB minus FP contrast
revealed activations in core regions within the prototypical
mentalizing network which included both the left and
right TPJ, the precuneus as well as the MPFC (table 2).
These results are consistent with previous studies using this
task [21,22].(c) Overlap analysis
The overlap analysis between the active minus passive and
human minus computer revealed shared activation in the para-
cingulate [−2, 54, 8] and the rTPJ [50, −60, 18] (figure 2). The
human minus computer overlapped with the FB minus FP con-
trast at the right medial frontal gyrus [10, 48, 30], in the
vicinity of the paracingulate cortex. Finally, the activations
maps in the active minus passive and the FB minus FP contrasts
overlapped in the TPJ bilaterally [−44, −60, 32; 58, −52, 28],
and the paracingulate cortex [−4, 50, 20] (figure 3).4. Discussion
In the present study, we examined the brain regions recruited
when people play an interactive game against an opponent
that they took to be either a human or a computer, and
either freely intentional or passively following a script. As
such, this is, to our knowledge, the first study in the literature
to de-confound these factors in a fully orthogonal design.
A key finding of our study is that a network of regions
involved in mentalizing was activated whenever participants
believed their opponent to be an intentional agent, irrespective
of whether they believed them to be a human or a computer.
As presented in table 2 and visualized in figure 2, the main
effect of intentionality bilaterally activated the TPJ, the precu-
neus, the aPCC and the right temporal pole. Converging
evidence that these are indeed brain regions consistently
implicated in mentalizing came from the substantial overlap
between these brain regions and those observed during the
ToM localizer task (figure 3). It has been suggested that the cor-
respondence of these brain regions with the mentalizing
network may reflect that the participants tried to mentalize
an opponent’s intention, tactics and emotion during the
game [14]. These results are clearly consistent with Dennett’s
[15] notion of an intentional stance that applies equally well
to human and non-human intentional agents.
The second main contrast, human minus computer, revealed
brain activity that was confined to the rTPJ and aPCC. In prin-
ciple, one interpretation of results from this contrast would
have been that it revealed effects owing to simulative mirror-
ing [24,25] of the human opponent that is not applied to the
computer opponent because it lacks the participants’ embodi-
ment. However, this interpretation fits less well with the
absence of any observation in the present study of activity in
the premotor cortex or inferior frontal gyrus, which might
have been expected if participants were simulating the actions
of their human competitors [25]. The absence of these and
other ‘mirroring’ effects does not count against an important
Figure 3. Overlaps between the FB minus FP (ToM localizer task; red) and the active minus passive contrast (RPS task, green), presented on coronal (Y =−58),
sagittal (X = 10) and axial (Z = 35) planes. Yellow reflects overlapping areas between the active minus passive and the FB minus FP contrasts. Only the left TPJ
[−44, −60, 32], right TPJ [58, −52, 28] and paracingulate cortex [−4, 50, 20] survived thresholding (Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05). Images are displayed in neurological
convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. (Online version in colour.)
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7role for mirroring in social cognition more generally, and may
make sense in the current study, given that participants were
never able to observe their competitor or their actions. This
is consistent with the results of a large meta-analysis (of over
200 fMRI studies) showing that the mirror network activated
in the presence of observable biological motion and the men-
talizing network activated when individuals inferred the
intentions of others based on abstract information and in the
absence of any perceivable biological motion [26]. As such,
this leads us to suggest that the observed activity in rTPJ
and aPCC for the human minus computer contrast reflects spon-
taneous mentalizing, rather than mirroring. These two regions
have been consistently activated during spontaneous mentaliz-
ing in other studies [27,28] and have previously been shown to
respond preferentially to action/stimuli that are deemed of
human (versus computer) origin [29,30]. Consistent with
claims that people have a basic tendency to differentiate
humans and computers along the lines of intentionality [31],
we suggest that the mere presence of the human competitor
in the present study was sufficient to cue participants tothink about their mental states, even though the passive
human competitor had no opportunity to deploy these strate-
gically in the game.
The third contrast of principal interest was the interaction
between intentionality (active versus passive) and agent
(human versus computer). Recall that one natural prediction
from the hypothesis that humans are a default target for men-
talizing is that activity in brain regions associated with
mentalizing will be disproportionately high for the active
human condition. In fact, the only brain region identified
with the interaction analysis was the left frontal pole (specifi-
cally at the base of the frontal pole ∼BA 11). This region has
occasionally been reported in studies of mentalizing [32,33],
but it was not identified either by the main effect of intention-
ality or by the ToM localizer in the present study. However,
the left frontal pole has frequently been implicated in inhibi-
tory control and the suppression of distractions that interfere
with the execution of goal-directed actions [34], as well as in
evaluative reasoning, in which salient but logically incorrect
alternatives must be ignored [35]. We propose that this
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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8activity can be understood in terms of the hypothesis that
humans are a default target for mentalizing, not because
the left frontal pole is involved in mentalizing per se,
but because it is recruited for overcoming this processing
default. As stated above, people have a basic inclination to
differentiate humans and computers along the lines of inten-
tionality [31] and to respond preferentially to stimuli and
actions that are generated (or believed to be so) by humans
[30]. Thus, if the default is to employ an intentional stance
towards a human and an instrumental or a physical stance
towards a computer, then the interaction observed in the
left frontal pole may reflect the need to deploy a different
stance to the one normally adopted to the interacting partner.
This interpretation may also be extended to account for the
deployment of the bilateral frontal pole in the computer
minus human contrast by making the plausible assumption
that participants have a general default to employ an inten-
tional stance when playing a competitive game such as RPS
which is compatible with their default for a human competi-
tor but not their default for a computer competitor. One can
also conjecture that the observed effect for the frontal pole is
owing to executive functions involved in the RPS game itself,
for example, in the attempts of inhibiting a natural tendency
to repeat the same move as the opponent, which would be
consistent with the role of the frontal pole in manipulating
and maintaining information from self-generated behaviour
[36]. Such processes might be specifically strongly activated
where participants might have been particularly competitive.
In all, the involvement of such control regions is consistent
with theoretical accounts, suggesting that the attribution of
intentionality and agenthood is a flexible process, and that
such flexibility in the attribution of intentionality (whether
to active or passive, human or computer agents) can be
manipulated volitionally and even strategically [37], but
that such strategic deployment works either with or against
the default stance for a particular target or activity.
The fact that playing a human competitor only activated a
subset of the regions of the ‘mentalizing network’ activated
when playing an intentional competitor (whether human or
computer) may be informative about the different function
of these brain regions for mentalizing. The recruitment of
additional regions when playing an intentional competitor
may reflect the difference between ‘mere mentalizing’, that
does not require the integration of mental states in an online
activity, and the use or deployment of mentalizing, that system-
atically draws on memory for task-relevant information (e.g.
what the opponent did last time; or how the identity of the
agent might determine her strategy) or resolves task-relevant
conflict (between the opponent’s intentions and the participant’s
own). These additional regions have been variably activated in a
variety of ToM tasks [38], and appear to play a general role
within the broader mentalizing network [38]. For example,
while there is some causal evidence that the left TPJ is asimportant as the rTPJ for processingmental states [39], it appears
to have a more general role in processing perspective difference
for both mental and non-mental states [40]. The precuneus has
been implicated in processing autobiographical memory and
visuospatial attention [41], and the temporal pole is involved
in face recognition and schematic knowledge of social memory
[42]. In addition, a closer look at activations of the rTPJ across
both contrasts reveals that participants recruited both the angu-
lar and the supramarginal gyri in the active minus passive
condition, and only the angular gyrus in the human minus
computer condition. This is confirmed in the overlap analysis
where the shared activation is in the angular gyrus. In this
regard, it has been proposed that the angular gyrus is selectively
involved in social cognition (‘mere mentalizing’, in the present
study), whereas the supramarginal gyrus is more involved in
attention reorienting [43], which is likely to be essential for use
of mentalizing for any practical purpose (see also [12]).
In conclusion, our results indicate that activation of the
‘mentalizing network’ might be specific to mentalizing, but it
is not specific to mentalizing about humans and can be acti-
vated by the mere belief that the target (human or not) is a
thinking entity. Interacting with humans versus computers,
however, induces activations in a more circumscribed right
lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, con-
sisting of the rTPJ and the aPCC, and which might be
reflective of people’s spontaneous tendency to attribute inten-
tionality to humans. Interestingly, frontal control regions
appear differentially active in response to violation of the
default stance adopted to the target, and the degree to which
we readily attribute human-like abilities to the target. Together,
these findings expand on earlier results from research investi-
gating human–computer interactions in various social games
[10,11,13,14,44]. They emphasize the importance of employing
an orthogonal design to adequately capture Dennett’s con-
ception of the intentional stance and, consistent with
Dennett’s view, suggest that the same neural mechanisms are
recruited formentalizing irrespective of the nature of the target.Ethics. The study was approved by the University of Birmingham
Research Ethics Committee, and written informed consent was
obtained from all participants.
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